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STATE CONTROL OF TELEVISION NEWS IN 1990s LEBANON
Marwan M. Kraidy
Since the official end of the war in 1990, Lebanese news media have been affected by several regulatory,
political, and economic factors. This article analyzes state attempts to control television news and political
programs in postwar Lebanon. Internal factors motivating control include media regulation and political
struggles between the regime and its opponents, and between government branches. External factors
include the strategic position of Lebanon's media in the Arab world, Lebanon's political and economic
dependence on some Arab regimes, and the advent of pan-Arab satellite broadcasting. Direct and indirect
forms of control are discussed.

As the financial and publishing center of the Middle East, pre-war Lebanon enjoyed a
thriving press and numerous publishing houses. The Lebanese press has occupied a central role
in the Arab world since the nineteenth century. It was at the forefront of the political struggles
that rocked the Middle East such as the Arab struggle against the Ottoman empire, Arab
nationalism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was due to the fact that the Lebanese capital was
a safe haven for Arab dissidents, since it was in Beirut that "most of the books the Arab world
read were published under the protection of the only Arab government that allowed freedom of
the press."1
The 1974-1990 war undermined Lebanon's role as a regional press center, but the country
nevertheless witnessed a proliferation of unlicensed private broadcasting resulting in more than
100 radio stations and 50 television stations. In 1990, Lebanese legislators and warlords met in
the Saudi Arabian city of Taef to bring the war to an end, under Arab sponsorship and backing
from the United States. Among other measures to end the war, the resulting Taef Agreement
called for the regulation of broadcasting.2 Since then, numerous conflicts have opposed the
administration and private media over state attempts to control news and political programs on
television.
The central regional role the Lebanese news media have occupied since Ottoman times
has now been given renewed vigor by the advent of satellite television. Because of their regional
importance, Lebanese news media are subjected to various political, ideological, and financial
influences, both from within Lebanon and from Arab countries. This paper analyzes state
attempts to control television news and political programs during Lebanon's first postwar decade.
It provides a case study of the mixed blessing enjoyed by news media —based in a small country
with relatively high levels of media freedom— whose influence reaches beyond national borders
into countries which impose stricter control over their media. After tracing the development of
Lebanese news media from the seventeenth century into the 1974-1990 war, the impact of the
war on news media is examined. Post-war official attempts to control news and political
programs are analyzed and discussed.
This paper is based on research conducted by the author between 1992 and 1998, using
three methods: (1) in-depth interviews with Lebanese journalists and broadcasters, (2) review of
the Arabic, French, and English language Lebanese press, (3) review of research on Lebanese
media and society, published in the United States, France, and Lebanon. In addition, recorded
television programs from Lebanon complemented the results gleaned from the three sources
mentioned above. No systematic monitoring services such as the BBC Monitoring Reports were
used in this research because the emphasis is not on television programming content, but on
events that determined the relationship between the state and the news media in Lebanon.

Constitutional Protection of Press Freedom
After being part of the Ottoman empire for several centuries, Lebanon reverted to a
French mandate after the First World War. It gained independence from the French in 1943,
although the Lebanese constitution was passed in 1926. The 1926 constitution declared Lebanon
a democracy, with separate government branches whose roles are defined as follows: legislative
power lies within a unicameral assembly, the Chamber of Deputies. Executive power is held by
the President of the Republic, elected to a nonrenewable six-year term by the Chamber of
Deputies. Judicial power is exercised by independent judges in courts of different orders. All
citizens aged 21 and older, male or female, are entitled to vote.3
The Lebanese constitution guarantees the rule of law, civil liberties, and religious
freedom. Article 8 states that "individual liberty is guaranteed and protected," and Article 9
stipulates that "liberty of conscience is absolute ... the state respects all creeds and guarantees
and protects their free exercise." Perhaps most significant is Article 13: "[F]reedom of expression
by word or pen, freedom of thought, freedom of holding meetings and freedom of association are
equally guaranteed within the framework of the law."4
The Lebanese Press
The first movable type printing press was introduced to Lebanon by Christian Maronite
monks in 1610, and the first newspaper, Hadikat al-Akhbar [The News Garden], was published
in 1858.5 European efforts to protect Lebanese Christians under nineteenth-century Ottoman rule
gave the Lebanese press a relatively high level of freedom, since Christians were active in
Lebanese journalistic circles. Consequently, a variety of newspapers and magazines reflected the
religious, political, and cultural pluralism of the population. Between 1870 and 1896, Lebanon
witnessed the birth of the first political, literary, and scientific magazine; the first children's
magazine; and the first women's magazine in the Arab world.6
Lebanese journalists were instrumental in creating and sustaining an anti-Ottoman
intellectual and political current in the Arab world. As a result, Ottoman repression made
Lebanese journalists flee to Egypt in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. There, they
resumed their professional activity with such vigor that by the early 1880s, two-thirds of
Alexandria's press and one-third of the Cairo press were owned and operated by Lebanese
journalists.7 At the same time, Lebanese expatriates launched several anti-Ottoman dailies in
Paris, London, New York, and Sao Paolo.8 Lebanese journalists worked freely in Europe and the
Americas, but the Lebanese press community in Egypt was subjected to Ottoman-sponsored
harassment. In 1892, for example, malcontents set fire to the offices of Al-Ahram [The
Pyramids], a leading Arabic-language daily launched in Egypt in 1875 by Lebanese brothers
Salim and Bishara Takla. Those who set the fire were probably angered by the newspaper's
systematic criticism of Ottoman policies. To this day, Al-Ahram [The Pyramids] is one of the
Arab world's most influential dailies.9
With the beginning of the twentieth century, a strong press activity returned to Lebanon.
Khalidi writes that in the period between 1908 and 1914, the period when Arab nationalism
emerged as an organized political movement, more than sixty newspapers were established in
Beirut alone.10 The advent of the First World War brought Ottoman persecution culminating in
1916 with the public hanging in Beirut of sixteen intellectuals and journalists, including al-

'Uraisi, al-Mufid's 25-year-old editor.11 These events testify to the important role played by the
Lebanese press and Lebanese journalists in the Arab world.
After Lebanon gained independence in 1943, press restrictions diminished and
newspapers and magazines multiplied. Many Lebanese publications were sponsored by foreign,
mainly Arab, powers, and the proliferation of outlets reduced advertising rates to unsustainable
levels.12 This situation of foreign political patronage and poor commercial performance
prompted legislation in the early 1960s to limit the number of publication licenses to twenty-five
political dailies and twenty weeklies. The 1962 Press Law protected freedom of the press, but it
also provided sanctions ranging from financial penalties to imprisonment of editors for abuses
such as insulting heads of states or stirring sectarian upheaval.13
During the 1974-1990 war, some journalists and publishers were harassed for publishing
material offensive to local and regional powers.14 In 1980, two prominent Lebanese journalists
were assassinated. Throughout the war, the Lebanese press was subjected to political and
financial pressure. The pressure continued in the postwar period. At the same time, the provision
of the press law limiting the number of publication licenses was rarely implemented. As a result,
fifty-three dailies, forty-eight weeklies and four monthly magazines, all licensed, appeared in
Lebanon in the early 1990s, in addition to more than 300 nonpolitical publications. 15
Broadcasting in Lebanon
Whereas radio in Lebanon was initially state-run, Lebanese television has been a private
enterprise since its 1956 debut, unlike most other Arab television systems.16 In 1977, the merger
of two television stations formed half private and half state-owned Télé-Liban.17 Unlicensed wartime Lebanese broadcasting was sustained by taxes levied by militias in the enclaves under their
control and by the desirability of alternatives to unreliable state-sponsored media. Initially
subsidized as political mouthpieces, some broadcasting outlets achieved commercial solvency
because of a strong advertising market.18
State Attempts to Control War News
Since the 1960s, the Ministries of the Interior and of Information have monitored television to
keep information detrimental to national security off the airwaves.19 This trend continued during
the 1974-1990 war, when government officials instructed television executives to restrict
information on the war.20 This kept citizens uninformed of key events: the 1974 shooting of a
Palestinian bus in a Beirut suburb by Christian Lebanese nationalists, one of the catalysts of the
war, was not announced on the evening news of the half-private, half-government-owned
television, nor on state-owned radio. The immediate result of this failure to report was the
slaying of a Christian student who, unaware of the event, drove through a Palestinian camp
where he was captured and murdered.21 As a consequence of such incidents, the Lebanese turned
to unlicensed radios and to the Arabic services of Radio Monte-Carlo and the British
Broadcasting Corporation.22
Factors Affecting State Control of Post-War News and Political Programs
Before the war, control of news was limited to national security issues such as sectarian
tension, attacks on Arab heads of state, and information about Israel. During the war, official

authority disappeared as militias governed territorial enclaves like small states within the state.
After the war, broadcasting regulation became a government priority and was closely followed
by the media. It is at this historical juncture that state attempts to control news and political
programs became official and systematic.23 Control was motivated by internal and external
factors.
Internal Factors. The necessity to regulate the chaotic broadcasting landscape in the
country resulted in heightened control over media content, including news. This occurred
simultaneously with attempts to control politicians opposed to the socio-economic policies of the
al-Hariri Cabinet to receive a wide audience.24 Another important internal factor consisted of
political struggles between the executive and legislative branches of government, where Prime
Minister al-Hariri and Speaker of the House of Deputies Berri fought for influence over
broadcasting regulation.25 In 1994, the Chamber of Deputies passed the “Audio-Visual Law" to
regulate broadcasting in Lebanon.
Regulating Chaos. A plethora of unlicensed private media risked adding to wartime
national disintegration because they might broadcast programming to stir sectarian tensions, or
give news coverage a sectarian slant. Besides, unlicensed broadcasting was reminiscent of the
wartime anarchy when the government relinquished control of all administrative, regulatory, and
law enforcement activities to militia warlords. Furthermore, economic and technical factors
prompted broadcasting regulation. Media proliferation reduced advertising revenues, caused
interference on the airwaves, and posed a threat to aviation and navigation.26
Controlling Opposition. In 1993 and 1994, several newspapers from across the
ideological divide were suspended for allegedly disparaging government officials, a punishable
offense according to the 1962 Press Law. According to Middle East Watch, a division of Human
Rights Watch, between 29 April and 28 May 1993, the government shut down three dailies and
one television network.27 On 23 March 1994, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution
prohibiting privately owned radio and television stations from broadcasting news and political
programs. At the same meeting, the Council of Ministers outlawed the Lebanese Forces, the
predominantly Christian political party and owner of the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation.
The LBC was and remains the country's top private television station, and was critical of the
Lebanese regime and of Syria's role in Lebanon.28
Following a 27 February 1994 church-bombing, LBC aired video clips branding the
government as anti-Christian. The Council of Ministers banned the Lebanese Forces because of
their alleged involvement in the bombing, although the Lebanese Forces denied the charges. At a
press conference largely attended by the foreign press, the Lebanese Forces' leadership
denounced what it called the "large set-up" mounted against its party. L'Orient-Le Jour [The
Orient-The Day], Lebanon's leading French-language daily, revealed that the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation was threatened with a shut down by the Council of Ministers if it
aired the Lebanese Forces' press conference. The television station was pressed to broadcast a
statement expressing its support of "all decisions taken by the Council of Ministers to reinforce
peace and security in the country."29 The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation complied and
issued a "communique" affirming its obedience to government decisions and its appreciation of
Syria's role in Lebanon.30 This signaled the fading of LBC's overtly belligerent position towards
the regime, while Lebanese Forces' leaders were subsequently cleared of the bombing charges.
The Political Struggle over Broadcasting Regulation. On 14 July 1994, the Lebanese
House of Deputies unanimously voted against the 23 March 1994 Council of Ministers
resolution banning news and political programs on privately owned broadcast media. A 15 July

1994 headline in Nida' al-Watan [The Call of the Nation], a Christian Lebanese nationalist daily,
succinctly summarized the feelings of the press and media community: "House avenges
broadcasting."31 Prime Minister al-Hariri was accused of collusion and conflict of interest, since
he owned substantial stakes in television and radio stations. He was at the same time
instrumental in their regulation.32
The Audio-Visual Law and Broadcasting Restructuring. On 19 October 1994, the
Chamber of Deputies passed the "Audio-Visual Law." This legislation provided a comprehensive
regulatory framework for private broadcasting, reaffirmed freedom of information within the
framework of the constitution, and established the National Council of Audio-Visual Media
(NCOAVM) with the task of laying down technical conditions, monitoring broadcasting, 'and
recommending sanctions when violations occur.33
The reaffirmation of freedom of information was a positive step. The law divided
television and radio stations into four categories, restricting news and political programs to First
Category stations. It also stipulated sanctions for the violation of its provisions and of other
Lebanese laws, including the 1962 Press Law. The Audio-Visual Law provided other positive
requirements such as the one mandating news bulletins to be objective and inclusive.34
Nevertheless, the Audio-Visual Law was criticized by journalists and politicians for
ambiguous wording in key provisions. The requirement that news and political programs could
not disturb "public order, national defense requirements and the public interest"35 was
ambiguously worded. One of the law's most worrisome provisions was Article 47, which
stipulated that "by request from the Ministry of Information, the National Council of Audiovisual
Media practices censorship over television and radio stations."36 Other critiques were leveled at
the enhanced power of the Information Minister, since the NCOAVM was largely consultative.
On 2 February 1996, the Lebanese Council of Ministers restructured private broadcasting
upon recommendations from the NCOAVM. Television stations were reduced from sixty to four,
and radio stations from 150 to ten.37 The Cabinet justified its decision by arguing that other
stations did not meet "financial and technical criteria" that the Cabinet had not clearly spelled
out, which led to charges of favoritism and unfair treatment by applicants that were denied
licenses.38 The Cabinet granted licenses to Prime Minister al-Hariri's Future television, Deputy
Prime Minister's family's Murr Television (MTV), and LBC, which had become the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI) after a capital expansion that brought regime
officials onto its board of shareholders, and finally NBN, a station which did not exist at that
time, owned by Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Nabih Berri. The National Broadcasting
Network (NBN) began broadcasting in August 1997.39
The restructuring of broadcasting was not immediately implemented. All television and
radio stations in Lebanon remained in operation for several months after the decision was
announced. However, on 18 September 1997, unlicensed stations were ordered to immediately
stop broadcasting news and political programs. The Council of Ministers granted an exceptional
status to al-Manar [The Lighthouse] television, owned and operated by Hizbollah, an Islamic
party. Al-Manar was allowed to broadcast news about anti-Israeli resistance in South Lebanon
until Israel withdrew from the Lebanese land it occupied. This decision was motivated by the
fact that Lebanon is officially in a state of war against Israel, and by the government's official
support of Hizbollah's armed resistance activities against the Israeli occupation of South
Lebanon.40
External Factors. External factors also influenced state attempts to control news and
political programs on television. The first was the influence of Lebanon's media in the Arab

world. The second was the advent of pan-Arab satellite broadcasting and the ensuing loss of
control over broadcasting by Arab governments.
Lebanon's Media in the Arab World. As mentioned earlier, Lebanon's media have a
strategic importance in the Arab world.41 Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was said to have
read the Lebanese press before reading Egyptian newspapers, in order to gain insights into
regional affairs on any given day.42 More than twenty Lebanese dailies are read in Arab
countries, and "seven or eight [newspapers] have for years distributed more outside the country
than inside Lebanon."43 Although the 1962 Press Law banned attacks on foreign heads of states,
many Arab leaders were criticized in Lebanese newspapers. As a result, Arab governments
frequently pressured Lebanese authorities to muzzle the press, and Lebanese newspapers were
banned in Arab countries in times of political instability.44
Broadcasts from Lebanon's private television stations spilled over the borders of Jordan,
Israel, Syria, and Cyprus.45 Like the press, Lebanese television often scrutinized Arab leaders.
Postwar Lebanese authorities feared a negative fallout of news and political programs critical of
Arab regimes. Politically, Lebanese officials could not tolerate embarrassment by private media
questioning the role played by Syria, the main power-broker in post-war Lebanon. Economically,
dissenting opinions critical of government performance could have a negative impact on Arab
and foreign investment in Lebanon's reconstruction drive. In this way, the regional success of
Lebanese media paradoxically contributed to increased control on their activities, a trend also
exacerbated by the arrival of satellite television broadcasting to the Middle East.
Satellite Broadcasting from Lebanon. Concerns about the impact of Lebanese media
outside of the country dramatically increased with the advent of satellite television broadcasting
in the Arab world. The Middle Eastern Broadcasting Center and the Egyptian government
satellite channel started a booming satellite industry.46 Competing governments and business
interests, from the Arab world and beyond, rushed into a race to control and distribute
information and entertainment beamed to more than 300 million Arabic speakers across the Arab
world.47
In Lebanon, the 1994 Audio-Visual Law provided for television stations that "transmit
via satellite and whose coverage exceeds the Lebanese territory."48 On 12 December 1996, the
Council of Ministers gave satellite licenses to Future television and the Lebanese Broadcasting
Corporation International, allowing both stations to broadcast news and political programs after
official clearance.49 Both stations' broadcasts via ARABSAT-2A became popular throughout the
region.50
Lebanon's two satellite stations had divergent editorial policies. Whereas Future, owned
by the Lebanese Prime Minister, de facto opted for an editorial policy loyal to the Lebanese
administration, LBCI remained critical of the regime.51 Future's news programs focused on the
perceived success of the regime's efforts to rebuild Lebanon's infrastructure and bring the
country back to its pre-war financial, cultural, and intellectual regional preeminence. Optimistic
prognostications painted a picture of a country briskly rising from the ashes of war. The clip that
signaled the beginning of programs every morning, "al-Balad Mashi W'al-Shoghel Mashi" [The
country's fine, and work/business is good] became associated with people's perspectives on the
regime, which was perceived to be falsely pretending the country was in the best possible
shape.52
LBCI, on the other hand, was critical of government performance. Its newscasts and
programs highlighted Lebanon's socio-economic problems and criticized the regime's heavyhanded methods with the media and labor unions. When LBCI broadcast a March 1997 interview

with a legal expert who questioned media repression in the Arab world, security forces
interrupted their satellite connection.53 As of early 1998, official complaint against the
government by LBCI with Lebanon's highest court, the Shura Council, is still
pending.54
A live LBCI interview with Roger Tamraz, a Lebanese financier wanted in Lebanon for
embezzlement and for contacts with Israel, triggered another crisis with the government. Tamraz,
now a citizen of the United States, gained fame in the United States when Senate investigations
in 1997 linked him to the White House campaign finance scandal. After the interview, LBCI
executives were summoned for questioning by Lebanese judiciary authorities.55 The judge in
charge of the matter later declared that LBCI had not violated any laws because the interview
was featured as a media scoop and was not meant to promote a Lebanese fugitive who
collaborated with Israel.56 Lebanese journalists and broadcasters told this author that the regime's
main concern was that LBCI' s satellite programs were "harming Lebanon's image abroad.57
Public statements by members of the regime indicated that they wanted LBCI to comply with the
government's "unified political discourse" preserving a "balance between depicting Lebanon's
democratic nature and not harming its relations with neighboring nations."58
A series of state attempts to control television news and political programs ignited some
of post-war Lebanon's biggest controversies. A December 1997 attempt by the Information
Ministry to ban Murr-Television from airing a live interview with opposition leader in exile
Michel Aoun led to several days of civil unrest and massive student demonstrations.59 To justify
his action, Information Minister Bassem al-Sabaa invoked concerns for "civil peace, Lebanon's
economic interests, Lebanon's relations with brotherly Arab countries," and for "public order and
national safety."60 Further attempts to ban live interviews with opposition politicians were
carried out in 1998, and the Lebanese government banned the broadcasting via satellite of all
news and political programs, while at the same time lifting all restrictions on news and political
programs broadcast within Lebanon.61 In other words, the regime allowed news to carry
dissenting voices domestically in order to prevent them from reaching beyond national borders.
Discussion and Conclusion
Lebanese wartime media anarchy necessitated regulation because of technical, political,
and commercial reasons. However, a closer look at political and media events during the 1990s
suggests that the Lebanese administration crossed the boundaries of law enforcement and
became authoritarian in its dealing with the news media, violating articles in the Lebanese
constitution that protect freedom of speech and of the press. Therefore, internal and external
attempts by the state to control news and political programs in post-war Lebanon can be grouped
into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct control involved explicit executive instructions to
the news media from the Cabinet or the Information Minister, and direct technical intervention.
Indirect control consisted of the convergence of political power and media ownership, which in
effect narrowed the range of mass mediated public discourse on the country's airwaves.
Direct Control. Direct attempts included decisions by the Council of Ministers to ban
news and political programs from private television and radio stations, such as the March 1994
decision. These decisions were often followed by campaigns of harassment against news media
that did not comply with government instructions. Another form of direct control included direct
intervention from the Information Minister. A case in point is the ban of Aoun's interview on
Murr Television in December 1997. The Lebanese government also resorted to direct technical

intervention to block television stations from airing newscasts and political programs critical of
the regime. The most flagrant example of direct intervention is when government agents
physically interrupted LBCI's earth station link in March 1997. Direct attempts to control news
and political programs thus ranged from intimidation to state-sponsored vandalism.
Indirect control. Indirect forms of control of news and political programs are perhaps
more threatening to democratic life and public opinion in the country, since they are often not
visible to the public. These include a political monopoly over the media and various levels of
economic controls.
The political monopoly over Lebanese media is transparent. Three out of four licensed
private television stations are owned by prominent members of the regime. Prime Minister alHariri owns Future Television, the family of Vice Prime Minister al-Murr owns Murr Television,
and Speaker of the House of Deputies Nabih Berri owns the National Broadcasting Network.
Future's newscasts are favorable to the regime, and political programs aired by the station
publicize and defend the Prime Minister's political and economic agenda. Satellite broadcasts are
a systematic public relations campaign to persuade Arab business interests and members of the
large Lebanese diaspora to invest in Lebanon's ambitious reconstruction drive. News bulletins
and political programs on Murr Television and the National Broadcasting Network are not as
subservient to the administration as Future's, but they usually avoid direct criticism unless their
interests are immediately threatened, such as when the Information Ministry banned MTV from
broadcasting Aoun's interview. News and political programs on all three stations are thus
indirectly controlled by government interests.
Since its September 1996 capital expansion, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
International has been indirectly controlled by a variety of interests, including members of the
current regime.62 The presence of several prominent politicians on LBCI's board of shareholders
explains the station's repeated challenges to state attempts to control its newscasts and political
programs: such controls constitute a financial threat since news generates large advertising
revenue. In fact, in its complaint to Lebanon's highest court against the state, LBCI did not
invoke any political or ideological grievances. Rather, the station cited threats to its professional
credibility and its inability to bring scoops as its main grievances.63 Unlike the other three private
stations, LBCI's editorial policy is affected primarily by economic factors, while political factors
are sometimes relegated to second place.64 This has the potential to lead to compromised
reporting on political issues in order to preserve profits.
The Lebanese news media have opposed state control attempts with some success.
Nevertheless, in 1998, eight years after the official end of the war, it appears that Lebanon's
authorities have violated democratic principles in order to control news and political programs
opposed to their policies. The election of Emile Lahoud to the Presidency of the Lebanese
Republic in November 1998 has sparked positive developments concerning the media and
freedom of expression. In his inauguration speech, President Lahoud vowed never to bring
charges against journalists for criticizing the regime and affirmed that his regime will protect
media freedom. No incidents of media harassment have been recorded, and the Cabinet, led by
Prime Minister al-Hoss, has promised to reopen the "broadcasting file" and look into complaints
of impartiality, even hinting that more television stations may be awarded licenses.65
Future research should investigate whether media control in Lebanon during the 1990s
was a temporary consequence of the state of war, or a more permanent situation. If state control
of the news media becomes permanent, Lebanon may eventually relinquish its position as the
leading democracy and news media center in the Arab world. This would be unfortunate at a

time when some other Arab countries are experimenting with varying degrees of media freedom
and democratic reform.66
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